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We analyze the transmission of global financial crisis to business cycles in China and India. 
The pattern of business cycles in emerging Asian economies generally displays a low degree 
of synchronization with the OECD countries, which is consistent with the decoupling 
hypothesis. By contrast, however, the current financial crisis has had a significant effect on 
economic developments in emerging Asian economies. Applying dynamic correlations, we 
find wide differences for different frequencies of cyclical development. More specifically, at 
business cycle frequencies, dynamic correlations are typically low or negative, but they are 
also influenced most by the global financial crisis. Finally, we find a significant link between 
trade ties and dynamic correlations of GDP growth rates in emerging Asian countries and 
OECD countries. 
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1  Introduction 
Globalization has been perhaps the key event in the world economy in the past two decades. 
During this gradual process, several emerging countries have gained in economic importance 
and have begun to influence economic developments in other countries (Akin and Kose, 
2008). This development has been dominated especially by the growing Chinese economy, 
supported by its export expansion into and investment from developed countries. Within a just 
a few years, China has become an important source of growth for the global economy. More 
recently, China has been followed by India and possibly also by some other smaller emerging 
economies in Asia. Not surprisingly, growth in China has changed the distribution of 
economic activities across the world. Between 1980 and 2007, the share of Chinese GDP in 
the world economy increased from 1.7% to 5.9% (valued at market exchange rates; the share 
would be even higher if purchasing power adjusted prices were used). Now, China is one of 
the most important exporting and importing nations worldwide. India seems to be following 
the development path of China more recently (see Winter and Yusuf, 2007, and Ysuf et al., 
2007), although India concentrates more on services than does manufacturing-oriented China. 
Moreover, in 2007 India’s share of global output was only 2.2%. Furthermore, rapid trade 
growth in Asia has been supported by large investment flows (see Eichengreen and Tong, 
2005, and Lane and Schmukler, 2007). 
The new structure of the world economy has also important implications for business 
cycles around the world. The increasing weight of emerging countries, especially the trade 
shares of the largest emerging Asian countries (China and India), have led to faster global 
growth. Despite the globalization trend, business cycles in industrial countries and emerging 
Asian economies have so far remained largely independent of each other. This is referred to 
as decoupling of business cycles in the recent literature (see Kose et al., 2008, Akin and Kose, 
2008, He et al., 2007). Nevertheless, recent developments since the onset of the global 
financial crisis in the second half of 2008 show that also these countries are not autonomous. 
IMF (2008) argues that the current slowdown of the world economy could have a 
significantly larger impact on Asian economies than earlier global downturns, because of 
more extensive trade and financial integration of Asian economies, especially with the USA. 
Furthermore, Hong et al. (2009) show in their historical analysis that earlier worldwide 
financial crises often had overwhelming impacts on the Asian economies. 
Trade flows are generally seen as important determinants of business cycles. Frankel 
and Rose (1998) find a robust positive relationship between trade intensity and correlation of 3 
business cycles between OECD countries. There is already a rich literature on trade between 
South Asian countries and the developed countries (see Bussière et al., 2008), and some 
papers also look at the determinants of the business cycles in South East Asia. Among others, 
a special issue of the World Economy was devoted to this issue (see de Grauwe and Zhang, 
2006). However, there are only a handful of papers dealing with the synchronization of 
business cycles in developed countries with those in emerging economies, and these (see 
Hughes Hallett and Richter, 2008, and Kose et al., 2008) often concentrate on description of 
stylized facts of business cycles in various regions. This paper extends the discussion by 
analyzing the determinants of business cycle convergence and divergence between OECD 
countries and the two largest emerging economies in Asia (often referred as the Asian giants). 
The main results of our paper are as follows. First, we show that business cycles in 
China and India have been very different from those of OECD countries, which favors the 
decoupling hypothesis. Second, the current global financial crisis has had largely similar 
effects on industrial countries and on emerging Asian economies, which would speak against 
decoupling. Finally, we analyze the relationship between trade and the degree of business 
cycle synchronization of emerging Asian economies with the industrial countries. We show 
that more intensive trade ties between the large Asian emerging economies and the OECD 
countries do increase business cycle correlations between them. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a literature survey on 
determinants of business cycle correlation with special focus on emerging economies. Section 
3 describes the growth experience of Asian emerging economies as compared to the industrial 
countries, both before and during the present financial crisis. Section 4 continues with an 
analysis of moving correlations between the two regions. Section 5 introduces the concept of 
dynamic correlation and presents dynamic correlations between GDP growth rates in 
emerging Asia and OECD. We also study how the financial crisis influenced co-movements 
of output in Asian emerging economies and industrial countries for different frequencies. 
Section 6 analyses the determinants of dynamic correlation of business cycles in Asian 
emerging economies, and the last section concludes. 
 
2  International Transmission of Business Cycles  
Economic development is determined both by domestic (e.g. aggregate demand shocks and 
budgetary policy) and international factors (external demand and international prices of traded 
goods). In open economies, the latter are playing an increasingly important role and often 4 
determine also domestic policies, which are aimed at insulating the economy from adverse 
external economic shocks. The Asian emerging economies with their strong export orientation 
could therefore be heavily exposed to foreign shocks (He et al., 2007).  
In their seminal paper, Frankel and Rose (1998) show that trade, and more generally 
economic integration among countries, can result in increased synchronization of business 
cycles between individual countries, since trade links serve as a channel for transmission of 
shocks between countries. In line with these considerations, Kenen (2000), using a Keynesian 
model, shows that the correlation between two countries’ output changes increases with the 
intensity of trade links. In turn, Kose and Yi (2006) analyze this issue in an international real 
business cycle model and conclude that, although the model suggests a positive relationship 
between trade and output, the effects are quantitatively small. However, the hypothesis of a 
positive relationship between trade and business cycles also has its opponents. For example, 
Krugman (1993) points out that as countries become more integrated, they can specialize to a 
greater extent. That is, the importance of asymmetric or sector-specific shocks increases with 
economic integration. This result may more cogently explain business cycles in emerging 
Asian economies (see Bátorová et al., 2008).  
In the empirical literature, the role of trade links has been studied extensively in this 
context. Despite theoretical ambiguities, several authors have demonstrated that countries 
trading more intensively also exhibit a higher degree of output co-movement (see e.g. Frankel 
and Rose, 1998, and Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005). However, it is not trade relations per se 
which may induce business cycle synchronization. Indeed, Frankel and Rose’s hypothesis 
underlines that bilateral trade is mainly intra-industry trade, although this indicator does not 
directly enter their analysis. Basically, the idea is that specialization increases the exposure to 
sector-specific shocks, which are transmitted via intra-industry trade. This, to an extent, 
combines Krugman’s insights with those of Frankel and Rose. Fontagné (1999) discusses the 
relation between intra-industry trade and the symmetry of shocks in a monetary union. 
Fidrmuc (2004) and Artis et al. (2008) show that intra-industry trade is a better indicator of 
business cycle asymmetries than simple trade intensities. 
Foreign trade is not the only factor affecting the degree of business cycle correlation. 
In many theoretical models, a greater degree of financial integration leads to lower business 
cycle correlation. In a standard two-country model with perfect capital mobility, the country 
encountering a positive productivity shock also receives capital inflows from the other 5 
country, leading to less similar business cycles.
1 Moreover, more complete financial 
integration enables greater specialization, which leads to lower correlation of national 
business cycles, as in Krugman (1998). However, in many empirical studies the correlation 
between financial integration and similarity of business cycles has been positive. 
Nevertheless, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2009) find that in a sample of twenty high income 
countries negative correlation does obtain when one controls for country-pair-specific factors 
as well as the global trend to greater integration. Given China’s relatively strict capital 
controls, it is not certain whether e.g. the increased flows of foreign direct investment would 
increase or decrease business cycle correlation.  Since China and India seem to be specializing 
vertically in their foreign trade, this channel may be less important for their business cycles. 
Actually, the specialization forces discussed by Krugman (1993) can dominate, which can 
cause business-cycle divergence between the emerging Asian giants and their trading 
partners. 
So far, the literature on business cycle correlation has concentrated mainly on 
developed economies. However, a number of studies have looked at business cycle 
correlation in Eastern Asia. For example, Sato and Zhang (2006) find common business 
cycles for the East Asian region. Moreover, Shin and Sohn (2006) find that trade integration 
(but much less financial integration) enhances the co-movement of output in East Asia.
2 
Kumakura (2006) finds that increasing the share of electronic products in foreign trade 
increases business cycle correlation for the countries around the Pacific. Also Shin and Wang 
(2004), Rana (2006 and 2007), and He et al. (2007) find that trade is an important determinant 
of business cycle correlation for East Asian countries. Iwatsubo and Ogawa (2009) analyze 
the similarity of external adjustments between Asian economies.  
So far, very few papers have looked at the correlation of business cycles in China and 
other emerging Asian economies versus those of the OECD countries. Hughes Hallett and 
Richter (2008) analyse the declining importance of the USA for Asia. Kose et al. (2008) find 
that there has been a convergence of business cycles within the OECD countries and within 
the emerging markets (including non-Asian countries) but a decoupling of business cycles 
between these two groups.  
 
                                                 
1 An opposite view is presented e.g. by Imbs (2004).  
2 Kočenda and Hanousek (1998) document a high degree of convergence and integration of the Eastern Asian 
capital markets. 6 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Growth Performance, 1990Q1-2008Q4  
  Mean  Max  Min  St. deviation 
Austria  0.006  0.022  -0.012  0.007 
Belgium  0.005  0.064  -0.060  0.014 
Denmark  0.004  0.028  -0.021  0.005 
Germany  0.004  0.027  -0.021  0.008 
Spain  0.007  0.039  -0.019  0.009 
Finland  0.005  0.031  -0.034  0.013 
France  0.004  0.021  -0.012  0.005 
UK  0.006  0.014  -0.016  0.005 
Italy  0.003  0.042  -0.019  0.008 
Netherlands  0.006  0.021  -0.009  0.005 
Portugal  0.004  0.043  -0.058  0.015 
Sweden  0.009  0.034  -0.043  0.014 
Switzerland  0.003  0.016  -0.009  0.005 
Norway  0.009  0.052  -0.064  0.025 
USA  0.006  0.018  -0.016  0.006 
Canada  0.007  0.085  -0.015  0.011 
Australia  0.008  0.026  -0.009  0.007 
New Zealand  0.007  0.043  -0.032  0.011 
Turkey  0.010  0.333  -0.220  0.058 
Mexico  0.007  0.039  -0.062  0.015 
Israel  0.010  0.065  -0.038  0.022 
Japan  0.000  0.029  -0.010  0.006 
Korea  0.012  0.038  -0.088  0.017 
China 
A  0.023  0.077  -0.027  0.014 
India 
B   0.016  0.036  -0.009  0.010 
Note: All variables are defined as first differences of seasonally adjusted indices in natural logarithm. A – period 
1992Q1-2008Q4. B – period 1993Q1-2008Q3. 
 
3  Data Description  
We use quarterly GDP data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. For developed 
countries, the time series start in the 1970s or 1980s. For India, we use IMF data between 
1993 and 2008. Where seasonal adjustment is required, we use the U.S. Census Bureau’s X12 
ARIMA procedure applied to the whole available period. 
Because the Chinese statistical authorities do not publish a quarterly real GDP series, 
we used the GDP deflator (available for a part of the sample period) to obtain real GDP from 
the quarterly series of nominal GDP. For periods in which the GDP deflator is not available, 7 
we were able to use the implicit GDP deflator based on Chinese statistical authorities’ 
reported year-on-year growth rates of real GDP. 
It should be noted that average growth has been higher in India and especially in 
China than in the OECD countries (see Table 1), and volatility of growth rates is relatively 
high there, in light of the size of the economies. During this decade China has been among the 
world’s fastest-growing economies, and India has lagged only slightly behind it. In recent 
years both growth of both economies has remained remarkably stable before accelerating in 
2007. In 2008, the global financial and economic crisis led to a definite growth slowdown in 
both countries. While both China and India have used domestic policies to support growth, 
imploding exports have lead to a slowing of overall economic growth.   
 























































Source: IMF, Own calculations.  
 
4  Moving Correlations of International Business  
Business cycles of emerging Asian economies are generally characterized by a low degree of 
business cycle correlation with developed countries (Kose et al, 2008). This result is at odds 
with the observations of Frankel and Rose (1998), as especially China has significant trade 
ties with major developed countries. Kose et al. (2008) show that there is some degree of 
business-cycle convergence within the groups of countries (emerging economies and 
industrial countries), whereas they cannot confirm convergence between the two groups. 
Bátorová et al. (2008) show that the low level of business cycle correlation is likely due to 8 
trade specialization of emerging economies in specific industries or production phases 
(especially intermediate products). In turn, trade among the developed economies consists 
mainly of intra-industry trade, which supports synchronization of the business cycles in the 
medium and long run. In a different vein, Pula and Peltonen (2009) show that trade statistics 
have been overestimating the level of integration, due to multiple counting of processed 
products. Their hypothesis is confirmed by their analysis of input-output tables for selected 
Asian economies. The high level of labor specialization means that the actual weight of trade 
links between the countries is significantly lower than suggested from raw trade data. Dean et 
al. (2008) arrive at a roughly similar conclusion.  
 
 
Table 2: Business Cycles Convergence and Financial Crisis, 1995 to 2008 
  China
















***  0.000 




  (0.182) 
  (-1.611) 
 
Asian crisis (1997-1998)  0.063
**  0.072
**  -0.154 




  (-5.074) 
  (-6.108) 
 
Dummy for 2008Q1  0.055
  0.063
  0.387 




  (5.853) 
  (5.934) 
 
Dummy for 2008Q2  0.120
*  0.118
  0.462 




  (6.960) 
  (6.878) 
 
Dummy for 2008Q3  0.183
***  0.171
**  0.595 




  (8.951) 
  (8.869) 
 
Dummy for 2008Q4  0.258
***  0.323
***   




   




  -0.080 




  (-2.154) 
  (-0.929) 
 
No. of countries   24
  19
  24 
  19 
 
No. of quarters   56
  56
  51 
  51 
 
No. of observations   1344
  1064
  1224 
  969 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the moving correlation of detrended GDP in selected countries. Core OECD: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, UK, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
USA, Australia, Canada, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and New Zealand. Emerging economies: Mexico, Israel, Korea, 
Turkey, China, and India. The dummy for Asian crisis in 1997-1998 equals one from third quarter of 1997 to 
fourth quarter of 1998, and zero otherwise. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance 
at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, respectively.  9 
Nevertheless, the global financial crisis in 2008 is likely to cause similar declines of 
aggregate output in all regions. Figure 1 shows the moving correlations of quarter-on-quarter 
GDP growth rates for a four-year moving window. For example, the correlation coefficient 
for 2008Q3 shows the correlations of business cycles in China/India with selected countries 
between 2005Q4 and 2008Q3. On average, business cycle correlations are zero for the whole 
sample, which confirms the decoupling phenomenon described in earlier papers. The results 
show also that the current financial crisis actually caused some increase of business cycle 
correlation between the large emerging economies in Asia and the USA. The slowing of 
growth in China, India and the USA began already in early 2008. However, the correlation 
with Germany remained relatively low also in 2008, while the similarities of business cycles 
with Japan have been even reduced.  
The pattern of international business cycles is much more volatile if we look at the co-
movements of all developed countries versus China/India. The effects of structural changes 
can be found via analyses of correlations within moving windows (see e.g. Rana, 2006). To 
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where ρ is the moving correlation coefficient of detrended output in selected countries versus 
China/India. We note that the correlation coefficient is bounded between -1 and 1 and use the 
Fisher transformation to transpose its values to an unbounded variable. The explanatory 
variables include trend, which shows whether there is some convergence of international 
business cycles, and dummy variables, Dq, for the individual quarters of 2008, which show 
the impact of the global financial crisis on China and India. We also include a dummy 
variable for the Asian crisis between 1997Q1 and 1998Q4, D97. The effects of the Asian 
crisis in 1997 and 1998 also provide an interesting benchmark for discussion of the current 
financial crisis (Hong et al., 2009).  
The results of this simple regression are given in Table 2. With respect to the 
discussion of decoupling, they confirm a weak positive trend of business cycle 
synchronization for both India and China. However, correlation of Chinese business cycles 
with other countries increases by just 0.01 per year on average. In India, the trend is 
statistically insignificant. The Asian crisis between the third quarter of 1997 and fourth 
quarter of 1998 had different effects on China and India: the 1997 crisis modestly increased 10 
the degree of business-cycle correlation for China, while it significantly decreased the 
similarity of Indian business cycles with those of other countries.  
Finally, we can see that the financial crisis had the same impact on Asian emerging 
economies as on the industrial countries. In China, the effect is significant already in the 
second half of 2008, and it is especially strong in the last quarter of 2008, despite fiscal 
expansion in China. The same pattern of development can be seen for India. The impact was 
significant already in the first half of 2008. Similarly to China, the third quarter showed 
greater similarity with business cycles in other countries. The differences between regional 
groups are modest. Unfortunately, the last quarter was not yet available for India.  
 
5  Dynamic Correlation Analysis of Business Cycles in Emerging Asia  
Correlation analysis is the most common approach for describing output synchronization 
between countries. Classical correlation is a standard measure of co-movement between time 
series. Unfortunately the classical correlation has two main drawbacks: first, it does not allow 
separation of idiosyncratic components and common co-movements. Second, it is basically a 
static analysis that fails to capture any dynamics in the co-movement. An alternative measure 
of synchronization in the case of business cycles is dynamic correlation, as was proposed by 
Croux et al. (2001). 
Consider two stochastic process, x and y, with defined spectral density functions, Sx(λ) 
and Sy(λ), and a co-spectrum Cxy(λ), which are defined for all frequencies -π ≤ λ≤ π. Then, the 
dynamic correlation according to Croux et al. (2001), ρ(λ), is defined as  
   () ( )








= . (2) 
The dynamic correlation coefficient is defined to be between -1 and 1, as is the standard 
correlation coefficient. Moreover, the average value of dynamic correlation over all 
frequencies is approximately, although not exactly, equal to the static correlation. Therefore, 
we can interpret dynamic correlations as a decomposition of the aggregate correlation into co-
movements at particular frequencies. Dynamic correlations show whether the global financial 

























































































































































































































Note: The x-axis shows frequencies defined on the interval 0 ≤ λ ≤ π. Business cycle frequencies are marked by 
shaded areas. The y-axis shows the dynamic correlations for individual frequencies.  12 




















































































































































































































Note: The x-axis shows frequencies defined on the interval 0 ≤ λ ≤ π. Business cycle frequencies are marked by  
shaded areas. The y-axis shows the dynamic correlations for individual frequencies. 13 
Figures 2 and 3 present dynamic correlations of business cycles in both Asian 
emerging economies and in selected industrial countries. We present two different periods in 
both figures. The full line shows dynamic correlations for the whole available period. The 
dotted lines show the level of synchronization of co-movements at various frequencies before 
the outbreak of the financial crisis. The differences between both indicators show the impact 
of the global financial shock of 2008 on output co-movements by frequencies.  
As usual in the literature, we look at three components of the aggregate correlation. 
First, the long-run movements (over 8 years) correspond to the low frequency band below 
π/16. Second, the traditional business cycles (lasting between 1.5 and 8 years) belong to the 
medium part of the figure (marked as a shadow area) between π/16 and π/3. Finally, the short-
run movements are defined by frequencies over π/3. Although it is common in the literature to 
neglect these developments, we will examine them here because the short-run dependences of 
economic development may be more important for China and India. It might also be expected 
that short-term shocks impact especially the co-movements in this range, while permanent 
shocks should influence the business cycle frequencies.  
We can see that business cycles in the large Asian emerging economies and selected 
developed economies vary significantly over the frequencies. The pattern is remarkably 
similar for China and India, in contrast to the pattern of dynamic correlations between 
developed economies. Both countries also show greater similarities with other emerging 
economies (e.g. Israel, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey).  
In particular, the OECD countries usually show high dynamic correlations for business 
cycle frequencies and long-term co-movements (see Croux et al, 2001). By contrast, China 
and India display quite low levels of dynamic correlations, especially for the business cycle 
frequencies (between π/16 ≈0.2 and π/3 ≈1). This confirms the decoupling hypothesis for both 
countries. Only a few countries show positive dynamic correlations at the business cycle 
frequencies. These include especially the non-European OECD countries (USA, Korea, Israel, 
and Japan). To a lesser degree, we can see also small positive correlations of long-run 
developments in Austria, Denmark, Finland, and perhaps the UK. In general, the non-
European OECD countries trade more intensively with China than with the other countries in 
our sample, which may explain some of the business cycle correlation. For India no clear 
pattern of trade could be discerned. Our results are also similar to the earlier findings by Shin 
and Sohn (2006) and Sato and Zhang (2006). As before, the non-European OECD countries 
also show a positive correlation at the lower range of the interval (close to eight years).  14 
We also find wide differences between the various short-run frequencies. In general, 
the dynamic correlations tend to increase at the right end of the spectrum. This would 
correspond to strong business linkages between suppliers from Asia and final producers in the 
developed countries. For China, the short-run correlations are high, especially for the USA, 
Korea, Japan, and Israel. All these countries can be characterized as having very close 
relationships with China over a longer period. Short-run correlation with the Indian business 
cycle is positive for Finland, Norway and Switzerland, even though their trade with India is 
quite modest. Only a few countries show comparably high positive correlation of long-run 
cycles with China and India. The dynamic correlations are usually slightly lower for India 
than for China, over the whole range of frequencies. 
Finally, the comparison of dynamic correlations with and without data for 2008 shows 
that especially dynamic correlations at business cycle frequencies have increased since the 
start of the global financial crisis. This pattern is stronger for China than for India. For both 
countries, the changed pattern can be seen especially in relation to the USA, UK, and 
Australia. By contrast, some small European economies (e.g. Austria), but also Korea and 
Mexico (for India, see Figure 3), show remarkable stability of business cycles as compared to 
China and India. This can be caused by important country-specific shocks before 2007 in 
these countries. As adding only a few observations does not alter the sample significantly, it is 
noteworthy that in almost all cases the solid line is above the dotted line, if any difference can 
be discerned. 
The impact of the global financial shock especially on the business cycle frequencies 
contradicts the decoupling hypothesis. The current development would imply that the low 
degree of business cycle synchronization may correspond to the large size (especially when 
we take population and GDP in purchasing power parity into consideration) of the emerging 
economies in Asia. The links between these economies and the industrial countries may also 
be weaker than suggested by the aggregate trade statistics (see Pula and Peltonen, 2009). 
Finally, the importance of idiosyncratic domestic shocks is likely to play an important role 
also in the low levels of business cycle correlation with the industrial countries.  
 
6  Factors Explaining the Pattern of Dynamic Correlations 
In addition to the stylized facts of the previous section, we briefly assess trade intensity as a 
potential determinant of business cycle synchronization between the Asian emerging 
economies and the OECD countries. In particular, we test whether the extent of foreign trade 15 
between a country and the emerging Asian giants influences dynamic correlations at the 
individual frequencies. The more intensive a country’s trade links with the emerging Asian 
countries, the stronger should be the synchronization of co-movements in economic activity  
with the region. Furthermore, the degree of synchronization may be different for different 
frequencies, because e.g. different economic policies may cause divergence between business 
cycles. We use foreign trade data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade statistics to calculate the 
average shares of China and India in exports and imports of the OECD countries between 
1995 and 2006. We use the ratio of this average to GDP in our empirical analysis. The period 
under review captures the rapid growth of China’s foreign trade. It shows the degree of trade 
links before the onset of financial crisis in 2008.  
In the previous section we calculated the dynamic correlation between Chinese and 
Indian GDP growth and growth in 23 OECD countries. As we saw earlier, correlations differ 
greatly across the OECD countries. Although it is difficult to see any clear pattern of dynamic 
correlations, our previous results showed that dynamic correlations tend to be higher for 
countries with intensive trade links with China and India. Moreover, comparison of dynamic 
correlations in 2008 and 2007 showed that especially the business cycles of China and India 
have become more similar to the business cycles of its main trading partners. This section 
tests this hypothesis. In particular, we estimate the following for the standard correlation and 
the dynamic correlation at all frequencies λ, 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) λ ε λ β λ β λ ρ j j j x + + = log 2 1  (3) 
Trade intensity before the financial crisis, denoted by x, is defined as the ratio of 
bilateral trade (average of exports and imports between 1995 and 2006) between OECD 
country j and China or India to GDP of the particular OECD country. This indicator shows 
the importance of both Asian countries to the OECD countries. We have 23 observations for 
each country paired with China and India, i.e. 46 observations for each frequency. Table 3 
presents the regression results for the static correlation and selected intervals of dynamic 
correlations, which were computed for the period 1990 to either 2007 or 2008. Moreover, we 
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β1  -0.090 





***  -0.060 **  -0.046
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 (-3.927) 





  (-2.308)   (-1.904)
 
β2 0.719 





*  0.586 **  0.622
** 
 (2.835) 





  (2.041)   (2.298)
 
N  46 





  46   46
 
2 R   0.135 





  0.066   0.087
 
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level, 
respectively. 
 
We do not include variables on financial integration to (1), although this was usually 
done for OECD countries (Imbs, 2004, Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005, Artis et al, 2008). 
However, these studies also show that the effects are often similar, because trade integration 
goes usually hand in hand with financial integration. Bátorová et al. (2008) show that OECD 
countries’ foreign direct investment (FDI) into China correlates with their trade to and from 
China, for example. According to China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE, 
2009) inward FDI stock accounted for almost 60% of China’s international liabilities at the 
end of 2007. As China maintains capital account restrictions for many transactions, this is not 
surprising. Portfolio liabilities were only 11% of the total.   
Although the results have to be viewed with some caution, they largely confirm the 
stylized facts of the previous section. In both analyzed years, trade intensity between the 
OECD countries and the Asian giants has a significant effect on the change in dynamic 
correlation of GDP at the business cycle frequencies. In turn, trade intensity has a milder 
effect on the dynamic correlation of GDP movements at the short-run frequencies (see Figure 
4), and it becomes insignificant at the right-hand side of the spectrum. The results confirm the 
positive relationship found usually for the OECD countries in the earlier literature following 
the initial contribution by Frankel and Rose (1998).  
The global financial crisis starting in 2008 has probably increased the closeness of the 
link between business cycles and trade in emerging economies, as all coefficients estimated 
for the period 1992-2008 are higher than those for 1992-2007. Moreover, the share of 
explained variance in Chinese and Indian co-movements with OECD countries increased after 
the financial crisis, although it remained relatively low. The most obvious explanation for the 17 
increased correlation of business cycles in the run-up and during the crisis is of course the 
collapse of foreign trade, which has affected both India and especially China. The financial 
crisis itself has had less of an impact for these countries, as their financial markets and banks 
are less integrated with the global financial system. 
 
Figure 4: Regression Results for Trade Intensity by Frequencies  
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Note: The x-axis shows frequencies defined on the interval 0 ≤ λ ≤ π. The y-axis shows the value of parameters 
estimated in (3) for individually frequencies. Confidence bands are constructed as 1.96 standard errors. Business 
cycle frequencies are marked by shaded areas.  
 
7  Conclusions  
Globalization has been one of the major events in the world economy in the last two decades. 
China and India played only a marginal role in the world economy before the 1990s. Whereas 
China was a predominantly agrarian economy before 1980, it is now to a large extent a 
modern industrial economy with booming urban regions. More recently, India has joined this 
pattern of economic development. We show that during the past two decades the business 
cycles in the large emerging Asian economies and in the developed economies have been 
quite different. Many transnational companies use emerging markets as a part of their 
production chains and this is especially true for the Asian economies. Despite this, most 
developed countries show low or even negative dynamic correlations with China and India for 
the traditional business cycles (cycles with periods between 1.5 and 8 years), which is 18 
generally referred to as decoupling of business cycles. However, the co-movements of 
business cycles have generally increased as a result of the global financial crisis. This 
contradicts the decoupling hypothesis discussed in the earlier literature, or at least represents a 
temporary setback in the possible trend towards lower correlation of GDP growth rates across 
major economies of the world. Our results indicate that the low level of business cycle 
synchronization between the Asian emerging economies and industrial countries is a result of 
idiosyncratic shocks in the former economies, which are still significantly poorer than OECD 
countries.  
It seems that countries with tighter economic ties with China and India also have 
higher dynamic correlation with these economies. This is especially true for long-term 
developments. However, trade integration now plays a diminished role for the convergence of 
business cycles than that documented for business cycles between the OECD countries. In 
sum, our first results confirm a special position of the emerging Asian giants in the business 
cycles of the world economy. Despite the increased trade links between the countries, both 
China and India behave quite differently from the rest of the world economy. This may be 
related to the shift of production from the OECD countries to the emerging Asian economies. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the recent economic crisis seems to have brought 
the Chinese and Indian business cycles closer to the OECD cycles. This may be because of 
the large common shocks e.g. to the global financial sector and the resulting implosion in 
investment demand in practically all countries of the world. However, our dynamic 
correlation analysis does not provide evidence as to possible directions of causalities. Instead 
of earlier dependence of emerging economies on developed countries (especially the US 
economy), the global economy may be moving to a situation characterized by increasing 
interdependencies between developed and emerging economies.  
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